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Abstract
This paper is concerned with the security control problem of the networked
control system (NCSs) subjected to denial of service (DoS) attacks. In order
to guarantee the security performance, this paper treats the influence of packet
dropouts due to DoS attacks as a uncertainty of triggering condition. Firstly,
a novel resilient triggering strategy by considering the uncertainty of trigger-
ing condition caused by DoS attacks is proposed. Secondly, the event-based
security controller under the resilient triggering strategy is designed while the
DoS-based security performance is preserved. At last, the simulation results
show that the proposed resilient triggering strategy is resilient to DoS attacks
while guaranteing the security performance.
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1. Introduction
In the past few decades, considerable research effects have been made on
the control issues of the NCSs where physical process, sensors and actuators
are linked together through communication network [1]. Modeling, analysis and
synthesis for the NCSs have been received great attention with its extensively5
applied in many potential areas such as internet of things (IoT), smart grids
and unmanned aerial vehicles [2, 3].
Because of the deep integration of physical systems and networks, communica-
tion resources, as the medium of signal transmission, become more and more
important for control implementations and many works devote themselves to10
save network bandwidth and reduce communication load [4, 5]. With the devel-
opment of digital circuits and networked control technologies, the event-based
control scheme has been paid more and more attentions from the control engi-
neering community [6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. This event-based strategy implement their
control actions as they need which lead to a less communication consumption.15
Recent years has witnessed significant advances on the event-triggered control
scheme and many results are discussed such as [11, 12, 13] and there references
in.
Obviously, these event-triggered control strategies are sensitive to sampled-data
while reducing the quantities of communication. These exchanged event-based20
data in the NCSs without security protection is easy attacked by malicious ad-
versaries [14, 15, 16] and this lead to time delay, packet dropouts and disorder
problems. Although such problems have been studied from different perspec-
tives for the traditional NCSs, they may be not suitable for safety constraint
scenarios. Hence,the NCSs are more and more vulnerable to various malicious25
attacks due to the ever-increasing openness of communication networks [17].
Recently, there are some works have been drawn attention to this raw field such
as [18, 19, 20, 21] and there references in and the most studies focus on two
common attack types, namely, DoS attacks [22, 23, 24, 25, 26] to communica-
tion networks and physical attacks [27, 28, 29, 30] to industrial process.30
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In this paper, we will discuss the DoS attacks for the NCSs. As well known,
time delays would be caused by DoS attacks. Although periodic attacks [23],
Bernoulli process [31, 24, 26], (hiden) Markov process [32, 33], zero-sum stochas-
tic game [34], time delay approach [35, 36], switched system model [24] are often
used to modeling the effects of DoS attacks in the NCSs, the time delay caused35
by DoS attacks is different from traditional ones caused by network uncertain-
ties. An DoS attacker may not follow any deterministic manners or specific
rules such as periodic behavior or probability distribution. Based on this view
point, the time delay approach is more suitable for describing the DoS attack
behaviors. By considering the energy-constraint of DoS attacks, the less con-40
servative for the time delay, the longer DoS duration can be tolerated for the
system. Therefore, it is necessary to design a security controller to tolerant a
more larger time delay or packet dropouts. For triggered-packet dropouts, Sun
et. al [37] investigate the stability of event-triggered control system subject
to one-step packet dropout with the concept of average dwell time in switched45
systems. Dimarogonas et. al [38] proposed a non-monotonic approach to cope
with the triggered-packet dropouts case. Perisis et. al [25] characterize the re-
lationship between frequency and duration of DoS attacks while preserving ISS
stability by estimating the system evolution with/without DoS attacks. Peng
et. al [36] proposed a co-design method for a resilient event-triggering strategy50
to tolerant a degree of packet dropouts by adjusting the triggering parameter.
Girard [39] proposed dynamic triggering mechanism for event-triggered control
when the event-triggered condition is violated. When a larger time delay caused
by DoS attacks, on the one hand, it is very conservative for solving LMIs and
hard to design a larger time delay tolerable controller, on the other hand, it is55
also not applicable for changing controller when the system is running although
such a larger time delay tolerable controller can be designed.
In fact, there always exist such a time delay caused by DoS attacks that the
system can not be tolerated for a given controller. Then the system have to
degrade running under this circumstance. By considering that the DoS attacks60
will lead to lost of security performance through altering the previous triggering
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condition, the main contributions of this technical note can be summarized as
• According to the alteration of triggering condition due to DoS attacks, a
novel security-performance-based resilient triggering strategy is proposed
under the DoS attack scenario.65
• The corresponding security performance analysis and event-triggered con-
troller design under the proposed resilient triggering strategy are discussed
in order to guarantee the NCSs security performance.
The reminder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives some pre-
liminaries of event-triggered control framework as well as the proposed resilient70
triggering strategy under DoS attack scenario. The main results are presented
in Section 3 where sufficient conditions are derived to guarantee the security
performance under the DoS attack. The Section 4 presents the security con-
troller design under the resilient triggering strategy and some simulation results
are shown in the following Section 5. The last Section 6 concludes this paper.75
2. Preliminaries and Problem Formulation
2.1. System framework
Consider a class of continuous time linear dynamics with exogenous distur-
bances as follows  x˙(t) = Ax(t) +Bu(t) +Bww(t)z(t) = Cx(t) +Du(t) (1)
where x(t) ∈ Rn, u(t) ∈ Rm, w(t) ∈ L2[0,∞) and z(t) ∈ Rp are state input
vector, input vector, disturbance and regulated output vector, respectively. A,
B, Bw, C, D are constant matrices with compatible dimensions. The initial
condition of the system (1) is given by x(t0) = x0.
The NCS framework is shown as in Fig. 1 where the control implementation
are relay on a shared communication network. Owing to the opening of net-
work, there are also some malicious attacks will imposed on the NCSs. It easy
4
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Figure 1 Diagram of the NCSs under DoS attacks
to see that the DoS attacks will affect both measurement channel (sensor-to-
controller) and control channel (controller channel) and one of them attacked
will block the control update.
Suppose that the sensor is time triggered with sampling period h and its sam-
pling sequence is described by the set S1 = {0, h, 2h, · · · kh}, k ∈ N. By collect-
ing these sampling data, the event trigger will transmit such sample data x(kh)
if the pre-designed triggering condition is violated. We denote these triggered
sampling sequence as the set S2 = {0, t1h, t2h, · · · tkh}. Obviously, S2 ⊂ S1.
Then the actuators will implement their control actions with these successfully
transmitted sampled data, namely,
u(t) = Kx(tk), t ∈ [tkh, tk+1h) (2)
However, the transmission failure will occur for these triggered packets when
they are suffering from DoS attacks. So, the control action will hold until the
DoS ceased and this leads to unexpected control performance.80
2.2. Security-oriented Resilient Triggering Strategy
In engineering practice, DoS attacks are hard to defense because it is often
posterior or unpredictable. Therefore, it is impracticable to change controller
or sampling frequency temporarily to tolerate such a attack. On the one hand,
the DoS attacks will caused bad control performance, but on the other hand,85
not all DoS attacks will lead to the system crash. That is, the NCSs may run in
degrade model with a certain security performance when DoS attacks happened.
5
That is, the actual error between the value of the last successful transmitted
state and the value of the current state is beyond the expected range due to
DoS attacks. So, we will focus on the excessive error which caused the alteration90
of the triggering condition. As shown in Fig. 2, there are three work models
ĊĊ ĊĊ
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Figure 2 Diagram of the NCSs under DoS attacks
according to the event-based triggering conditions
• Safety region. In this region, there are no DoS attacks and every triggered
packets can be transmitted successfully.
• Resilient region. In this region, there are DoS attacks and an extra trig-95
gered error is generated. However, this error can be tolerable for the
NCSs.
• Un-safety region. In this region, there are DoS attacks and an intolerable
error for the NCSs is generated.
In order to describe the performance lost caused by DoS attacks in more detail,
it is necessary to illustrate the proposed resilient triggering strategy based on the
security-based performance. For clear exposition, we first denote the last suc-
cessful control update time instant as tkh and the future transmitted sampling
instant according to the security event-triggered condition (no extra triggered
error) as tk+1h. However, tk+1h may be prolong to t
dos
k+1h (t
dos
k+1h > tk+1h) due
to DoS attack with limited energy. If denote ikh as the current sampling instant
during the k-th time interval, then the following expression ξ(ikh) is given to
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indicate an DoS attack behavior for each sampling instant
ξ(ikh) =
 1 DoS attack0 No DoS attack (3)
In general, one can launch their DoS attacks at any time but limit duration.
Therefore, we can described the limited energy of DoS attacks by
∆dostk+1h = t
dos
k+1h− tk+1h (4)
and
∆dostk+1h ≤ ∆dos (5)
where ∆dos represents the maximum duration of DoS attacks.
Let
e(ikh) = x(ikh)− x(tkh) (6)
where e(ikh) represent the error between the value of process state x(tkh) at
the last successful control update and the value of process state x(ikh) at the
current time.
In order to record the pre-designed triggered instant tk+1h and x(tk+1), an
buffer is needed for the event-trigger. Then, the extra error due to DoS attacks
can be calculated by
edos(ikh) = x(ikh)− x(tk+1h) (7)
where edos(ikh) represent the error between the value of process state x(tk+1h)
according to previous triggering condition and the value of process state x(ikh)
at the current time. Obviously, the introduction of error edos(ikh) will lead to a
bad control performance, even security problem. Based on the above analysis,
we will illustrate our proposed security-orient resilient triggering strategy as
follows
tdosk+1h =tkh+ min
t
{t ∧ ikh|δxT (tk)Φx(tk)− eT (ikh)Φe(ikh)
+ ξ(ikh)Υ(∆
dos
tk+1h
) ≤ 0}
(8)
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where Υ(∆dostk+1h) represent the variation of triggering condition with Υ(∆
dos
tk+1h
) =
(edos(ikh))
TΦedos(ikh) due to DoS attack.
According to (5), one can obtain that the uncertain of triggering condition
should be constrained by limited energy of DoS attacks, namely,
Υ(∆dostk+1h) ≤ Υ (9)
In addition, we can divide the holding interval of the t ∈ I into subsets I` =
[ikh+ τik , ikh+h+ τik+1) with I = ∪I` according to [40], and the delay version
of system can be constructed for every two successfully transmitted instants by
defining η(t) , t− ikh. Then, the controller can be transformed into
u(t) = K(x(t− η(t))− e(ikh)) (10)
and the actual control action with sample-error-dependent model is given as
follows  x˙(t) = Ax(t) +BK(x(t− η(t))− e(ikh)) +Bww(t)z(t) = Cx(t) +DK(x(t− η(t))− e(ikh)), t ∈ I` (11)
Remark 1: We refer to an effective DoS attack as the fact that may prevent100
control update from being executed at desired time. In fact, the control perfor-
mance lost is caused by this triggering variation (9) due to DoS attacks. In or-
der to indicate the maximum allowable performance lost for control system, the
triggering variation Υ(∆dostk+1h) should be limited by (9) for the control system.
Noticed that if ξ(ikh) = 1 for t ∈ (tkh, tk+1h), the DoS attacks will not make105
any difference to control update. Likewise, if ξ(ikh) = 1 for t ∈ (tk+1h, tdosk+1h),
this implies there are triggered packets dropped by the DoS attacker with it-
s duration ∆dostk+1h and this would to the extra triggering error Υ(∆
dos
tk+1h
). If
ξ(ikh) = 0 for t ∈ (tk+1h, tdosk+1h), there is no effective DoS attacks and the event
triggering strategy will degenerate into the common static triggering condition110
such as in [40].
2.3. Control objectives
Take the variation of triggered condition caused by DoS attacks into con-
sideration, the problem of interest is that of finding a appropriate control gain
8
under the above resilient triggering strategy (8) while ensuring a certain security115
performance. In detail, the following two states are shown to reflect our control
goals
1. When there are no DoS attacks, the system (11) is asymptotically stable
with H∞ performance.
2. When there are DoS attacks, the security performance with uniformly120
ultimately bounded is achieved, i.e. the performance lost ||L(x(t))|| ≤ B.
Here, ||L(x(t))|| is the performance lost due to DoS attacks with its upper bound
B.
3. security-orient analysis under DoS attacks
In this section, the security performance analysis are given by some math-125
ematical derivation. The following Proposition 1 shows that the uncertain of
triggering condition with extra error will arouse a large time delay.
Proposition 1. Let Υ(∆dostk+1h) > 0 be the control performance lost under DoS
attacks. Then tk+1h ≤ tdosk+1h for the resilient triggering rule in (8).
Proof: Let ζT (ikh)Φζ(ikh) = δx
T (tk)Φx(tk) + Υ(∆
dos
tk+1h
) with Υ(∆dostk+1h) ≥
0. Assume that tk+1h > t
dos
k+1h, then
δxT (tk)Φx(tk)− eT (idosk h)Φe(idosk h) > 0 (12)
However, recalling the prescribed resilient event-triggering condition in (8), the
following inequality
0 ≥ Υ(∆dostk+1h) + δxT (tk)Φx(tk)− eT (idosk h)Φe(idosk h)
≥ δxT (tk)Φx(tk)− eT (idosk h)Φe(idosk h)
(13)
will make a contradiction with (12). Therefore, we can easily obtained that130
tk+1h ≤ tdosk+1h.
Subsequently, we will carry out the robustH∞ and security performance analysis
for the NCSs subjected to DoS attacks and the result is shown by the following
Theorem 1.
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Theorem 1. For some given positive constants h, ηm ≥ 0, ηM (≥ ηm) and a
controller K, if there exist real matrices P > 0, Φ > 0, Qi > 0, Ri > 0 (i = 1, 2)
and S of appropriate dimensions such that Z2 S
ST Z2
 > 0 , Ξ =
 Ξ11 Ξ12
∗ Ξ22
 < 0 (14)
where Ξ22 = diag[−Z−11 ,−Z−12 ,−R−1,−I],
Ξ11 =

ϕ11 Z1 ϕ13 0 −PBK PBw
∗ ϕ22 ϕ23 S 0 0
∗ ∗ ϕ33 ϕ34 −δΦ 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ϕ44 0 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ −Φ + δΦ 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ −γ2I

and
Ξ12 =

ηmA
T ηAT ηMA
T CT
0 0 0 0
ηm(BK)
T η(BK)T ηM (BK)
T (DK)T
0 0 0 0
−ηm(BK)T−η(BK)T−ηM (BK)T−(DK)T
ηmB
T
w ηB
T
w ηmB
T
w 0

with135
η = ηM − ηm
ϕ11 = A
TP + PA+Q1 − Z1 − pi24 R
ϕ13 = PBK +
pi2
4 R+ δΦ
ϕ22 = Q2 −Q1 − Z1 − Z2
ϕ23 = Z2 − S140
ϕ33 = −2Z2 + S + ST − pi24 R+ δΦ
ϕ34 = Z2 − S
ϕ44 = −Z2 −Q2
Then, under the resilient triggering strategy (8), the system (11) is with the
following property145
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• When there are no DoS attacks, the system (11) is asymptotic stable with
H∞ performance.
• When there are DoS attacks, the security performance with uniformly ul-
timately bounded ||x(t)|| ≤
√
V (0)+
ξ(ikh)Υ(∆
dos
tk+1h
)
ρ
λ(P ) is achieved with perfor-
mance lost B = {||L(x(t))|| ≤
√
ξ(ikh)Υ(∆dostk+1h
)
ρλ(P ) }.150
where ρ is related to Ξ and λ(P ) is the minimum eigenvalue of P .
Proof: Firstly, we consider the following candidate Lyapunov-Krasovskii
function Vx(t;x(t)) such that
Vx(t;x(t)) = V1(t;x(t)) + V2(t;x(t)) + V3(t;x(t)) + V4(t;x(t)) (15)
where
V1(t;x(t)) =x
T (t)Px(t)
V2(t;x(t)) =
∫ t
t−ηm
xT (s)Q1x(s)ds+
∫ t−ηm
t−ηM
xT (s)Q2x(s)ds
V3(t;x(t)) =ηm
∫ 0
−ηm
∫ t
t+θ
x˙T (s)Z1x˙(s)dsdθ+
(ηM − ηm)
∫ −ηm
−ηM
∫ t
t+θ
x˙T (s)Z2x˙(s)dsdθ
V4(t;x(t)) =η
2
M
∫ t
ikh
x˙T (s)Rx˙(s)ds
−pi
2
4
∫ t
ikh
[x(s)− x(ikh)]TR[x(s)− x(ikh)]ds
Then, taking the time derivative along the trajectory of system (11) yields
V˙1(t;x(t)) =2x
T (t)P [Ax(t) +BKx(t− η(t))
−BKe(ikh) +Bww(t)]
(16)
V˙2(t;x(t)) =x
T (t)Q1x(t)− xT (t− ηM )Q2x(t− ηM )+
xT (t− ηm)(Q2 −Q1)x(t− ηm)
(17)
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V˙3(t;x(t)) =x˙
T (t)(η2mZ1 + (ηM − ηm)2Z2)x˙(t)
− ηm
∫ t
t−ηm
x˙T (s)Z1x˙(s)ds
− (ηM − ηm)
∫ t−ηm
t−ηM
x˙T (s)Z2x˙(s)ds
(18)
V˙4(t;x(t)) =− pi
2
4
[x(t)− x(t− η(t))]TR[x(t)− x(t− η(t))]
+η2M x˙
T (t)Rx˙(t)
(19)
By using Jessen inequality, the following relationship hold
−ηm
∫ t
t−ηm
x˙T (s)Z1x˙(s)ds ≤
− [x(t)− x(t− ηm)]TZ1[x(t)− x(t− ηm)]
(20)
Since
 Z2 S
ST Z2
 > 0, it follows that
− (ηM − ηm)
∫ t−ηm
t−ηM
x˙T (s)Z2x˙(s)ds ≤
− [x(t− ηm)− x(t− η(t)]TZ2[x(t− ηm)− x(t− η(t)]
− [x(t− η(t))− x(t− ηM )]TZ2[x(t− η(t))− x(t− ηM )]
+ 2[x(t− ηm)− x(t− η(t)]TS[x(t− η(t))− x(t− ηM )]
(21)
Define χT (t) = [x(t), x(t− ηm), x(t− η(t)), x(t− ηM ), e(ikh), w(t)] for the aug-
mented dynamical system given by (11). Thus, substituting (16)-(19) into (15),
taking (20) and (21) into account, we can find that
d
dt
V (t;x(t)) ≤ χT (t)[Ξ1 + ΓT1 (η2mZ1 + η2MR(ηM − ηm)2Z2)Γ1]χ(t) (22)
where
Γ1 = [A, 0, BK, 0,−BK,Bw]
and
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Ξ1 =

ϕ11 Z1 ϕ13 0 −PBK PBw
∗ ϕ22 ϕ23 S 0 0
∗ ∗ ϕ33 ϕ34 0 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ϕ44 0 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 0 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 0

with
ϕ11 = A
TP + PA+Q1 − Z1 − pi24 R
ϕ13 = PBK +
pi2
4 R
ϕ22 = Q2 −Q1 − Z1 − Z2
ϕ23 = Z2 − S
ϕ33 = −2Z2 + S + ST − pi24 R
ϕ34 = Z2 − S
ϕ44 = −Z2 −Q2
In what follows, we consider the robust H∞ performance for the studied system
with external disturbance. Recalling the fact that ||z(t)|| ≤ γ||w(t)||, it is easily
to see that
d
dt
V (t;x(t)) + zT (t)z(t)− γwT (t)w(t) ≤ 0 (23)
Further,
d
dt
V (t;x(t)) ≤ χT (t)[Ξ2 + ΓT1 (η2mZ1 + η2MR+
(ηM − ηm)2Z2 + η2MR)Γ1 + ΓT2 Γ2]χ(t)
(24)
where Γ2 = [C, 0, DK, 0,−DK, 0, 0] and
Ξ2 =

ϕ11 Z1 ϕ13 0 −PBK PBw
∗ ϕ22 ϕ23 S 0 0
∗ ∗ ϕ33 ϕ34 0 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ϕ44 0 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 0 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ −γ2

with
ϕ11 = A
TP + PA+Q1 − Z1 − pi24 R
13
ϕ13 = PBK +
pi2
4 R
ϕ22 = Q2 −Q1 − Z1 − Z2
ϕ23 = Z2 − S
ϕ33 = −2Z2 + S + ST − pi24 R
ϕ34 = Z2 − S
ϕ44 = −Z2 −Q2
It is clear that
Ξ2 + Γ
T
1 (η
2
mZ1 + (ηM − ηm)2Z2)Γ1 + ΓT2 Γ2 < 0 (25)
and this means that there is a positive scalar ε such that ddtV (t;x(t)) < ||χ(t)||2 <
−ε||x(t)||. Therefore, one can conclude that the system (11) is asymptotically
stable and H∞ performance of the studied system.
At last, considering the resilient triggering condition in (8), it is clear that
eTikh(t)Φeikh(t) ≤ δxT (tk)Φx(tk) + ξ(ikh)Υ(∆dostk+1h) (26)
thus, we obtain that
d
dt
V (t;x(t)) ≤ d
dt
V (t;x(t)) + ξikh(t)Υ(∆
dos
tk+1h
) + δxT (tk)Φx(tk)− eTikh(t)ΦeTikh(t)
≤ χT (t)ΞχT (t) + ξ(ikh)Υ(∆dostk+1h)
(27)
where Ξ is defined in (14).
Because of Ξ < 0, there must be a appropriate positive ρ such that χT (t)ΞχT (t) ≤
−ρV (t). From (27),
d
dt
V (t;x(t)) ≤ −ρV (t) + ξ(ikh)Υ(∆dostk+1h) (28)
Multiply eρtand integral on both sides of (28), then
V (t) ≤eρtV (0) + ξ(ikh)Υ(∆
dos
tk+1h
)
ρ
(1− e−ρt)
≤V (0) + ξ(ikh)Υ(∆
dos
tk+1h
)
ρ
(29)
It is clear that
xT (t)Px(t) ≤ V (t) ≤ V (0) + ξ(ikh)Υ(∆
dos
tk+1h
)
ρ
(30)
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So,
||x(t)|| ≤
√√√√V (0) + ξ(ikh)Υ(∆dostk+1h)ρ
λ(P )
(31)
where λ(P ) is the minimum eigenvalue of P .
Obviously, the performance lost is only related to the last term of (30) and it
satisfy that
B ∈ {L(x(t)) : ||L(x(t))|| ≤
√
ξ(ikh)Υ(∆dostk+1h)
ρλ(P )
} (32)
with B =
√
ξikh(t)Υ(∆
dos
tk+1h
)
ρλ(P )
Remark 2: Theorem 1 shows that the security of network would affect the con-
trol performance of the NCSs. In fact, we can see that the control performance
is DoS-depended from (32). The bigger Υ(∆dostk+1h), the more performance lost.155
In addition, the performance is also related to parameter ρ. The bigger ρ, the
less performance lost. As well known, ρ is regard to the converge rate of the
system. Intuitively, a fast converge rate will be more robust to DoS attack.
4. Security Controller Design under the Resilient Triggering Strategy
In this section, the event-based controller under the proposed resilient trig-160
gering is discussed. Based on Theorem. 1, we found that only the term Ξ is
related to controller K. So, the following Theorem 2 is used to controller design
in order to achieve the above two goals.
Theorem 2. For some given positive constants h, ηm ≥ 0, ηM (≥ ηm), if there
exist real matrices P > 0, Φ > 0, Qi > 0, Zi > 0 (i = 1, 2) and S of appropriate
dimensions such that Z2 S
∗ Z2
 > 0, Ξ =
 Ξ11 Ξ12
∗ Ξ22
 < 0 (33)
15
where Ξ22 = diag[Z1 − 2X,Z2 − 2X,R1 − 2X,−I],
Ξ11 =

ϕ11 Z1 ϕ13 0 −BY PBw
∗ ϕ22 ϕ23 S 0 0
∗ ∗ ϕ33 ϕ34 −δΦ 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ϕ44 0 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ −Φ + δΦ 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ −γ2I

and
Ξ12 =

ηmA
T ηAT ηMA
T CT
0 0 0 0
ηm(BY )
T η(BY )T ηM (BY )
T (DY )T
0 0 0 0
−ηm(BY )T−η(BY )T−ηM (BY )T−(DY )T
ηmB
T
w ηB
T
w ηmB
T
w 0

with
η = ηM − ηm165
ϕ11 = XA
T
+AX +Q1 − Z1 − pi24 R
ϕ13 = BY +
pi2
4 R+ δΦ
ϕ22 = Q2 −Q1 − Z1 − Z2
ϕ23 = Z2 − S
ϕ33 = −2Z2 + S + S
T − pi24 R+ δΦ170
ϕ34 = Z2 − S
ϕ44 = −Z2 −Q2
then, the controlled system (11) can be secured by K = Y X−1 under the resilient
triggering strategy (8), namely,
• When there are no DoS attacks, the system (11) is asymptotically stable175
with H∞ performance.
• When there are DoS attacks, the security performance with uniformly ulti-
mately bounded ||x(t)|| ≤
√
V (0)+
ξ(ikh)Υ(∆
dos
tk+1h
)
ρ
λ(P ) and the performance lost
16
B ∈ {L(x(t)) : ||L(x(t))|| ≤
√
ξ(ikh)Υ(∆dostk+1h
)
ρλ(P ) } is achieved.
Proof: Define X = P−1, Qi = XQiX, Zi = XZiX (i = 1, 2), Si = XSX,180
Φi = XΦX and Y = KX. Then pre- and post- multiplying both sides
of left term of inequality with diag[X,X] and right term of inequality with
diag[X,X,X,X,X, I,X,X,X, I] for the second condition in (14), we can arrive
at the second condition in Theorem 2 by using the fact that −HG−1H ≤ G−2H
for appropriate matrices to deal with the non-linear terms. Then the system185
(11) is asymptotically stable with H∞ performance index γ for the disturbance
attenuation when there are no DoS attacks. Based on the designed controller,
the second goal can be easily obtained.
Based on the above the designed controller, we will describe the system work-
flow as the following Fig.3. In fact, the controller K, δ and Φ can be designed190
according to [40]. Once there parameters are given, the system will be run in
an excepted performance.
But the error e(ikh) will keep increasing regardless the e
T (ikh)Φe(ikh) >
Figure 3 Workflow of the NCSs under DoS attacks
δxT (tk)Φx(tk) or not when there are DoS attacks. However, when e
T
ikh
(t)Φeikh(t) >
17
δxT (tk)Φx(tk)+Υ(∆
dos), the state must be transmitted. If not, an un-tolerable195
performance lost will be caused and this may be lead to the system crash.
5. Illustrative example
In this section, a simulation example is used to illustrate the security control
method under the resilient triggering strategy.
Let us consider the pendulum example borrowed from [40] with its plant dy-
namics given by
x˙(t) =

0 1 0 0
0 0 −mgM 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 − gl 0
x(t) +

0
1
M
0
− 1Ml
u(t) +

1
1
1
1
w(t) (34)
where M = 10 is the cart mass, m = 1 is the mass of the pendulum bob, l = 3 is
the length of the pendulum arm and g = 10 is the gravitational acceleration. For
simplicity and clearly, the external disturbance is neglected here and the initial
state is x(0) =
[
0.98 0 0.2 0
]T
. Taking the sampling period h = 0.01s.
It is easy to see that the system is unstable when there are no control input.
According to the controller design method in this paper, we choose the following
parameters as δ = 0.1, γ = 200, η1 = 0 and η2 = 0.05. Then the corresponding
feedback controller and the triggered matrix are obtained as
K =
[
2.9972 11.0572 297.9713 166.0562
]
(35)
and
Φ =

1.4640 −3.5258 −7.7964 14.0335
−3.5258 19.8779 39.2554 −71.6757
−7.7964 39.2554 79.5624 −144.9050
14.0335 −71.6757 −144.9050 263.9816
 (36)
Case I: No DoS attacks
When there are no DoS attacks, the response of system (34) with the designed
controller under the event-triggered communication scheme are depicted in Fig.4200
18
and the release instants and release intervals for the event-triggered communi-
cation strategy without resilience are shown in Fig.5, respectively.
The statistics shows that 234 packets are transmitted and the average period
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Figure 4 State response without DoS attacks
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Figure 5 Release intervals without DoS attacks
is 0.2115s. Also, Fig.4 shows that the system state converges to zero with a
good performance.205
Case II: Probabilistic DoS attacks
When there are DoS attacks imposed on the system (34), the aforemention
event-triggered communication scheme is violated. Suppose that the upper
bound of the uncertain of DoS attacks Υ = 10. In what follows, a proba-
19
bilistic DoS attack and the worst case DoS attack are shown.210
First, we simulate the probabilistic DoS attack with manipulate parameter
ξ(ikh). Take ξ(ikh) = 1 with probability α = 0.02 with its attack sequence
is shown as following Fig. 6. With the above designed controller and the re-
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Figure 6 Probabilistic DoS attacks with α(ξ(ikh) = 1) = 0.02
silient triggering bound, the response of system (34) under the probabilistic is
depicted in Fig.7 and the release instants and release intervals are shown in215
Fig.8, respectively.
The statistics shows that 246 packets are transmitted and the average period
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Figure 7 State response with probabilistic DoS attacks
is 0.2029s. Here, the smaller average transmission period is shown. However, a
20
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Figure 8 Release intervals with DoS attacks
worse performance during such DoS style is presented by comparing Fig.4 and
Fig.7 which implies that a DoS attacks can lead to a bad performance indeed.220
Case III: The worst DoS attacks case
The last scenario consider the worst DoS attack. Under such attack case,
ξ(ikh) = 1 is always hold except the instants which reach the up bound of
the resilient region. Similarly, we can obtain the following figures on ||x(t)|| and
release intervals.225
The statistics shows that 145 packets are transmitted and the average period
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Figure 9 State response with DoS attacks
is 0.3277s. The less sample data are transmitted and a larger average transmis-
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Figure 10 Release intervals with the worst DoS attacks
sion period is obtained. Although ||x(t)|| is bounded, a worse performance is
presented by comparing Fig.7 and Fig.9 which implies that one should trade-off
between control performance and network security.230
6. Conclusions
As so far, we have investigated the resilient triggering strategy for the event-
based NCSs under DoS attacks. For the NCSs, the following three facts are: the
DoS attacks is unpredictable, 2) it is impractical to change a controller when
system is running, and 3) the network security will propagate to the physical235
system which will lead to the lost of control performance. Based on the above
facts, the NCSs must be capable to tolerate a certain degree of DoS attacks. In
this paper, a novel resilient triggering strategy caused by DoS attacks is proposed
and the control performance lost is well confined according to the designed
event-based controller. It is worthy noting that the proposed resilient triggering240
strategy takes the relationship between the uncertain of triggering condition
and the control performance lost into consideration while dealing with the DoS
attacks. For the proposed resilient triggering strategy, we must guarantee the
successful transmission of the control signal which reach to the up bound of the
uncertain of the triggering condition. Or the NCSs may be crashed by DoS245
attacks. The simulation result shows the validity of our theorem results.
22
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